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principle as a rule of law. Perhaps the scarcity of detailed English
language studies on the subject hampered us in this regard, but
Justice Challies' book is sufficiently detailed and complete to
serve as a practical guide, and where its text itself will not
suffice its ample citations will facilitate references to sources.
Robert A. Pascal*
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$5.00.
When Fred Vinson became Chief Justice of the United
States in 1946, most of the constitutional issues relating to the
scope of federal power under the commerce and taxing clauses
and the war power had been resolved by decisions uniformly in
favor of national authority. The due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments had been deprived of vitality as
substantive limitations on legislative power in the sphere of
economic activity, and civil liberties had become the major area
of constitutional limitations and, except for the negative restraints of the commerce clause upon state power, the last outpost
of judicial review of legislative action. The developments leading
to this state of judicial affairs were treated by Mr. Pritchett in
1948 in a volume entitled The Roosevelt Court (New York, The
Macmillan Company, 1948), to which the instant volume is a
logical sequel, but unlike most sequels the continuation is even
better than its precursor.
Because of the circumscribed area of judicial review, aside
from an occasional decision like that of the Steel Seizure case
which involved executive action, Mr. Pritchett gives a fairly
complete account of the work of the Vinson Court even though
he confines his book to civil liberties. Although he depicts in
detail the individual differences of the Justices as revealed in
their printed opinions he omits the personal antagonisms which
rent the Court from 1946 to 1953, and wisely so because however
important such conflicts may have been in determining the course
of judicial decision data on them are far too meager to be
conclusive. Like The Roosevelt Court, Civil Liberties and the
Vinson Court is a study in judicial values. In executing this

0

Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

VOL. XIV

study Mr. Pritchett first surveys judicial decisions affecting free
speech, loyalty programs, the rights of aliens, the equal protection clause as applied to racial segregation, and trial procedure.
In so doing Mr. Pritchett not only provides a valuable account
of constitutional developments in the area of civil liberties, but
also an account of the positions assumed by the individual
members of the Court.
Following his review of the principal decisions Mr. Pritchett
provides a quantitative analysis of agreements and disagreements
among individual judges and of the ratio of concurrence among
individual Justices with each other. With characteristic tolerance
and modesty Mr. Pritchett makes no great claims for this method
as an approach to the study of constitutional law, but he does
state that such data are effective "in revealing at any one time
the anatomy of opinion on the Court" and in tracing "shifts of
judicial positions and the realignments resulting from the appointment of new justices to the Court." (p. 180) Thus from
1946-1948, Vinson, Reed and Burton constituted the center of the
Court. With the deaths of Murphy and Rutledge followed by the
appointments of Clark and Minton the four Truman appointees
joined by Justice Reed dominated the decisions of the court for
the next four years with Black and Douglas forming increasingly
often a liberal minority and with Frankfurter and Jackson constituting with less frequency a conservative minority. However,
under the domination of the Vinson wing of the Court concurrence between the conservatives and the liberals also became
more frequent. As might be expected Justice Clark was the most
agreeable member of the Court with only fifteen dissents in four
years.
Perhaps the best portion of Mr. Pritchett's book is the analysis in the last four chapters of the libertarian activism of
Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge; the libertarian
restraint of Justice Frankfurter; the values of the Vinson majority; and the relationships between democracy and judicial review,
for it is here that the author summarizes the values of the
conflicting elements of the Court and presents his conclusions
concerning the work of Chief Justice Vinson and his Court. It is
in these chapters, too, that the author outlines the conceptions
which the justices hold of their judicial role and the obligations
imposed upon them by the judicial function. In general Justices
Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge envisaged the judiciary
as an instrument for cutting through formal concepts to protect
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the rights of submerged and unpopular groups even though this
may amount to judicial legislation. Justice Frankfurter, who has
not always been consistent in civil liberties cases, presents the
perplexing phenomenon of h Justice devoted to liberty but unable
to advance its cause due to his conceptions of the limitations
of judicial review and for that matter of the entire judicial function. Out of deference to Congress, the President, state legislatures and state courts, and from a sense of the judiciary's inadequacy as the least representative of government institutions
Justice Frankfurter has refused to impress his personal convictions upon the law even "to the point of complete immobilization,
leaving him unable to reach any decision at all in a case." (p.
223)
The remaining Justices who served during this period are
designated "the less libertarians" because they were consistently
less in favor of civil liberties claims than the other five. Of "the
less libertarians" the unpredictable Justice Jackson, largely
because of his concern about searches and seizures, was more
favorable to civil liberties than the others, with Clark and Burton being somewhat more favorable than Vinson, Minton and
Reed. Because Chief Justice Vinson could not become the intellectual leader of his Court as Marshall and Taney did in an earlier
period, he had to assume the role of compromiser; and, as Mr.
Pritchett points out, he failed in this role on the basis of the
statistics of dissent. That someone else might have failed more
in this respect the author readily admits. In any event the Chief
Justice became "very nearly the most negative member of the
Court on libertarian claims." (p. 229)
In the non-unanimous decisions affecting civil liberties, and
most of the decisions during this period were not unanimous, a
majority of the Vinson Court sustained civil liberties in only a
minority of instances. Only in cases involving Negro rights in
which the claims of Negroes were sustained in 75% of the cases
did a majority of the Vinson Court favor civil liberties; most of
the time 39% of aliens' claims were sustained in all the nonunanimous cases, 35% of the claims of criminal defendants in
state cases and 43% in federal cases, 25% of the claims in state
free speech cases and only 17% in federal free speech cases, for a
general average of 35% in all the cases. How did it happen that
this record of the Court which had decided many cases that in
other years would have been regarded as liberal fell far short of
values placed on liberty by the liberal intellectuals? According
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to Mr. Pritchett, it was brought about because a majority bf the
Court mistakenly converted Chief Justice Stone's conception of
judicial restraint into judicial abdication, equated democracy and
majority rule, and identified judicial review and limited government with minority rule. The questioning of the democratic
character of judicial review combined with frequent open disagreements among the Justices, in Mr. Pritchett's opinion, have
weakened the moral prestige of the Court.
Although skeptics may cavil at Mr. Pritchett's statistical
compilations of the votes of individual judges, they and all others
will find his study of civil liberties as interpreted by the Vinson
Court extremely valuable. First, Mr. Pritchett provides a complete survey of civil liberties decisions from the October term of
1946 to the October term of 1953. Second, his account of the
personal factors involved in judicial decision provides much
information on the mental processes of individual Justices.
Fourth, he raises important questions concerning the role of
judicial review in a representative government which suggests
the necessity of further studies of this American institution.
Finally, Mr. Pritchett is not so fettered by his statistics as to
avoid reaching his independent conclusions or offering significant criticisms of the work of the Court as a whole and of the
Justices individually. Future writers will undoubtedly be more
concerned with doctrinal developments, but for a long time Mr.
Pritchett's book will remain a useful contribution to the literature of constitutional interpretation generally and of civil liberties in particular during the period in which the Court accommodated itself to the cold war and mass hysteria.
Robert J. Harris*
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